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WHEN "VICTORY" MASKS RETREAT: THE
LSAT, CONSTITUTIONAL DUALISM, AND
THE END OF DIVERSITY
D. MARVIN JONESt
INTRODUCTION

In 1839, Africans aboard the Amistad killed most of their
captors and forced a surviving Spanish sailor to sail them toward
their home. The Spanish sailor did indeed sail for Africa-during
the day. At night, he sailed toward the American coast. As a
result, the ship zigzagged north and landed off the coast of Long
Island. The slaves, who had fought for their liberty at a time
when the American Revolution was still a vivid memory, were
promptly arrested, charged with murder, and held to determine
whether they were free men or cargo to be handed over. Spain,
the American officer who captured the Spanish ship, and the
residents of Long Island who first helped the Africans get to
shore, all later claimed the slaves as property.
The federal District Court held that the Africans were free
and that they had been kidnapped in violation of Spain's own
laws. 1
The Circuit Court affirmed.
Unbeknownst to the
Africans, the United States appealed the decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court in order to protect its relationship with "Her
Catholic Majesty" of Spain. In the film Amistad, which recounts
t Professor of Law at the University of Miami. I attended the St. John's
conference on law school admissions as the Chair of the Law Professor's Division of
the National Bar Association. However, the positions advanced herein, as well as
any mistakes, are my own.
1 See United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 519 (1841).

ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 80:15

this famous story, the Africans light a bonfire and dance in
celebration of their impending freedom. They had been told it
was the job of the court to say what the law is. Two federal
courts had certainly spoken.
Roger Baldwin (Matthew McConaughey), the bespectacled
abolitionist lawyer had to break the news to Cinque (Djimon
Hounsou) that in America, it is just not that simple. The plight
of the Africans reflected the conflicting legal norms between
American domestic law, which recognized and protected the
institution of slavery, and international treaties and laws, which
condemned the practice of abducting Africans and transporting
them across the high seas. This conflict, in turn, hinged on the
conflict between economic and political interests and our nation's
professed commitment to equality.
How could any lawyer
explain this ante-bellum American "dilemma" to the innocent,
hapless Africans? Why indeed must they remain imprisoned
after the court ordered that they were "free"?
Baldwin struggled for a moment and then presented an
apology; the law had "almost worked," he said. "Almost worked!"
Cinque, hearing this, said to his abolitionist counsel, "What kind
of a land is this where you almost mean what you say? Where
2
laws almost work?"
Grutter v. Bollinger3 was celebrated by both liberals and
conservatives as a victory for affirmative action. But some
victories mask retreat. It is ironic that the new, colorblind racial
system announced in Grutter may prove more effective in
containing the challenges posed over the past few decades by
movements for racial justice than any intransigent, overtly racist
4
backlash could possibly have been.
The case arose when the University of Michigan School of
Law rejected Barbara Grutter, a white female with a 3.8 grade
point average and a 161 LSAT score. She argued she was denied
admission because race, rather than her objective qualifications,
was a "predominant" factor in her non-selection. 5 She challenged
2

AMISTAD (Dreamworks Video 1997).

3 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4 HOWARD WINANT, THE NEW POLITICS OF RACE: GLOBALISM, DIFFERENCE,

JUSTICE (2004).
5 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317 ("Petitioner.. . alleged that her application was
rejected because the Law School use[d] race as a 'predominant' factor, giving
applicants who belong to certain minority groups 'a significantly greater chance of
admission than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups.' ")
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not only the policy at the University of Michigan's law school, but
also a long standing precedent-the 1978 case of Board of
Regents v. Bakke. 6 The decision in Bakke, written by Justice
Powell, famously held that while all race-conscious programs
were subject to strict scrutiny and required, inter alia, a
compelling justification, the need for diversity in admissions
7
justified the consideration of race.
The long standing consensus that Powell was right was
upset when the Fifth Circuit, in the infamous Hopwood8 case,
momentously set forth a revisionist interpretation-that Powell's
decision was not the law, and the claim of "diversity" was not a
sufficiently compelling reason to discriminate against innocent
whites in the admissions process. Grutter is widely touted as a
victory because it rejected the "heresy" of Hopwood and affirmed
that Powell's decision was the law; it affirmed a qualified right of
even state-run law schools to consider race.
Grutter went on to place the imprimatur of the Supreme
Court on the value of having a student body that includes
individuals from different racial and ethnic groups. Race matters
and is relevant in the context of the need for a diverse student
body. More specifically, the Grutter Court went so far as to
uphold the value of having a "critical mass" of black students. 9
Grutter erased the shadow of Hopwood. So the story goes, "We
won!" Finally. Hurrah!
Despite the new life that Grutter was supposed to have
breathed into the constitutional legitimacy of race consciousness
in admissions, law schools are becoming increasingly
resegregated.
There is a systemic, nationwide decline in
minority enrollment that has been ongoing for the last ten

(citation omitted).
6 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7 See id. at 320.
8 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003). Hopwood examined the University of Texas School of Law's admissions
program that gave substantial racial preferences to certain classes of minority
students. Id. at 934. In holding this policy unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court noted the law school had failed to present a compelling
justification for preferring some races over others, even when the purpose was
correcting racial imbalances in the student body. Id.
9 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36 ("The Law School's goal of attaining a critical
mass of underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a
quota.").
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years. 10 Several factors converge to create the problem. One
factor, a constant for many years, is of course the gap between
the mean LSAT scores of blacks and whites. The mean score for
blacks is 141.6.11 For whites, it is 152.1.12 But like race, LSAT
scores are in themselves a neutral fact. The new problem flows
from a pattern of law schools imposing increasingly higher
13
minimum LSAT requirements.
I. IMPACT OF MINIMUM LSAT REQUIREMENTS
A preliminary study of fifteen
illustrates the trend.

School

Albany
Brooklyn
Buffalo
Cardozo

2004 Official
Guide i
25th
# / % A-A
LSAT
148
154
152
152

53 / 6.6%
77 / 5.0%
52 /7.1%
44/4.5%

New York law schools

2006 Official
Guide ii
25th
# / % A-A
LSAT
151
158
152
157

36 / 4.8%
60 / 4.0%
46/6.2%
43/4.1%

Net
Change
A-A
-32%
-22%
-12%
-2%

10 As John Nussbaumer, professor and associate dean at the Thomas M. Cooley
Law School, has noted:
The total number of African-Americans enrolled at all ABA-approved law
schools peaked in 1994 at 9,681 students, which at that time represented
7.5% of all enrolled students....
From 1994-2004 .... total law school enrollment increased to 140,376
students (+8.8%) and total minority enrollment increased to 29,489
students (+19.8%). But total African-American enrollment decreased from
9,681 to 9,488 students (-2%), which represents just 6.8% of all enrolled
students.
John Nussbaumer, Misuse of the Law School Admissions Test, Racial
Discrimination, and the De Facto Quota System for Restricting African-American
Access to the Legal Profession, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 167, 167-68 (2006) (footnotes
omitted).
11 This is based on 1999-2000 figures. SUSAN P. DALESSANDRO, LISA A.
STILWELL & LYNDA M. REESE, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, LSAT PERFORMANCE
WITH REGIONAL, GENDER, AND RACIAL/ETHNIC BREAKDOWNS: 1997-1998 THROUGH
2003-2004 TESTING YEARS 13 (2005).

Id.
The ABA denies accreditation to any law school with average scores below
this level; indeed, the usual requirement is average LSAT scores of at least 142. In
addition, it tends to deny accreditation to a school that admits any students,
regardless how few, with scores below 140. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
12

13
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CUNY
Columbia
Cornell
Fordham
Hofstra
New York
NYU
Pace
St. John's
Syracuse
Touro
Totals

145
166
164
157
145
148
168
149
151
148
144
153

66 / 14.3%
108 / 9.2%
32 / 5.6%
125 /8.3%
75/ 8.4%
101/6.7%
100 / 7.6%
40 / 5.6%
60 / 6.5%
46 / 5.9%
74/11%
1,053 /
7.2%i ii

148
167
164
160
151
151
167
151
153
152
148
155

51 / 11.4%
111 / 9.0%
45 / 7.6%
90/5.9%
61 / 6.0%
94/6.1%
119 / 8.8%
26 / 3.4%
63 / 6.6%
34 / 4.3%
75/9.9%
954 /

-23%
+3%
+41%
-28%
-19%
-7%
+19%
-35%
+5%
-26%
+1%
-9%

6.3%iv

i Data collected in Fall 2002.
ii Data collected in Fall 2004.
iii Total enrollment for all schools was 14,573 students.
iv Total enrollment for all schools was 15,054 students.
While the study includes a limited number of law schools,
given the above-mentioned gap in test scores, the trend so
obviously reflected here is virtually inevitable for schools that
have similar admissions policies.
According to Professor Shepherd, there are no accredited law
schools that admit students with LSATs of less than 142.14 This
is higher than the average score for blacks. This minimum cutoff approach represents an irrebuttable presumption that
students who do not have at least a 142-the majority of black
would-be applicants-are unfit to go to law school. This is
disturbing because many students who are disqualified in this
way actually have significantly higher grades than their white
counterparts.

14 George B. Shepherd, No African-American Lawyers Allowed: The Inefficient
Racism of the ABA's Accreditation of Law Schools, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 114

(2003).

None of the ABA-accredited law schools ha[ve] students with an average
LSAT score below approximately 142. The ABA denies accreditation to any
law school with average scores below this level; indeed, the usual
requirement is average LSAT scores of at least 143, In addition, it tends to
deny accreditation to a school that admits any students, regardless how
few, with scores below 140.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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According to William Kidder, "the data reveal that law
school applicants with essentially equivalent college grades are
apt to receive widely discrepant LSAT scores depending upon
15
their race or ethnicity."
Combined data from 1976 to 1979 and 1985 reveal that 26% of
African Americans with 3.25+ UGPAs were denied admission
from every ABA law school to which they applied, compared to
14% of Chicanos and 15% of Whites .... White Applicants
consistently had higher admissions rates than African
16
Americans among those with 3.75+ UGPAs ....
Ironically, the test makers themselves argue against using
the LSAT in this manner.
As the Law School Admission
Council's own guidelines state, "[t]he LSAT should be used as
only one of several criteria for evaluation and should not be given
undue weight solely because its use is convenient" and that
"[c]ut-off LSAT scores.. . are strongly discouraged" because,
"[s]ignificantly, cut-off scores may have greater adverse impact
upon applicants from minority groups than upon the general
applicant population." 17 Furthermore, according to Dean John
Nussbaumer, there is no "valid, reliable, and objective evidence
establishing that these practices have a legitimate educational
purpose."' 8 The imposition of cut-off scores represents an as yet
unanchored over-reliance upon and misuse of the LSAT.
This over-reliance upon the LSAT is the proximate cause of
the systemic decline in minority enrollment. 19 Of course the
current trend is merely the camel's nose in the tent. Absent
affirmative action, to have an even chance of getting into an elite
school, such as the University of Michigan, one needs a 165 on

15 William C. Kidder, Comment, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and
Ethnic Differences in EducationalAttainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving "Elite"
College Students, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1084 (2001) (quoting Joseph Gannon, College
Grades and LSAT Scores: An Opportunity to Examine the "Real Differences" in
Minority-Nonminority Performance,in TOWARDS A DIVERSIFIED LEGAL PROFESSION
282 (David M. White ed., 1981)).
16 William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History
of African American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions, 19502000, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 26-27 (2003).
17 LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, CAUTIONARY POLICIES CONCERNING LSAT
SCORES

AND

RELATED

SERVICES

(2005),

publications/CautionaryPolicies.pdf.
18 Nussbaumer, supra note 10, at 170.
19 See id.

available at http://www.lsacnet.org/

2006]

WHEN '"ICTORY" MASKS RETREAT

the LSAT. 20 As Justice Thomas noted, only 1.1% of black
students score at that level. 2 1 If the current trend continues,
with schools continuing to raise their numerical prerequisites,
the prospect of law schools returning to the virtually lily white
patterns of the 1960s is practically assured.
The imposition of minimum LSAT requirements nullifies the
beneficial effects of Grutter on several levels. In the aftermath of
this great victory of Grutter, we are experiencing an incredible
duality. While Grutter trumpets the value of diversity as a
matter of law, the practical reality is one in which diversity is
devalued; Grutter supports the inclusion of a "critical mass" of
black students, but in practice, the artificial headwinds of elitist
standards are moving minority admissions increasingly in the
direction of token representation. This duality in practice flows
from the duality of the opinion. The problem is not that the
Court did not mean what it said when it banged its powerful
gavel in favor of diversity and racial inclusion. It is simply that
the emancipatory significance of Grutter occurs at a sterile,
abstract, and formal level. While Grutter did hold all those
things that resonate as "victory," the question is how did the
Court get there? The rationale and the elitist norms that
animate the opinion constitute a fertile subtext in which
institutional exclusion has taken root.
Gary Orfield, attempting to understand the phenomenon of
resegregation in inner city schools, attributes much of what is
happening in that context to the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court which reversed or radically revised much of constitutional
law in this area in a series of opinions after 1988.22 The
resegregation of the inner city schools ironically seems to begin
about the same time. He argues the two patterns are linked. I
believe something similar is happening here. The reasoning and
normative framework of Grutter, despite its emancipatory billing,
has empowered the current resegregation pattern.

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 376 n.14 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting an LSAT score of 165 is used as a
benchmark because the University of Michigan School of Law uses it as the relevant
score range for an applicant to be considered).
21 Id. at 376.
20

22

GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD

UNIVERSITY, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? 17-19 (2004),
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/brown50.pdf.
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II. LOCATING GRUTTER: UNIVERSALISM V. CONTEXT

Initially there were two models of affirmative action. 23 The
liberal wing on the Court associated affirmative action with the
integrative ideal, a remedy for continuing discriminatory barriers
minorities face in our society. Thus, Justice Marshall states, "We
recognized, however, that these principles outlawing the
irrelevant or pernicious use of race were inapposite to racial
classifications that provide benefits to minorities for the purpose
24
of remedying the present effects of past racial discrimination."
Under this approach affirmative action programs were
viewed as benign. "A Program that employs racial or ethnic
criteria... calls for close examination;" when a program
employing a benign racial classification is adopted by an
administrative agency at the explicit direction of Congress, we
are "bound to
approach
our task with appropriate
deference .".."25 Within the "benign discrimination" model the
context of the historical experience of blacks as a group trumped
the formalism of equal protection methodology, which since
Korematsu required as a rule that all racial classifications be
subjected strict scrutiny. 26
Thus, under this approach
affirmative action was reviewed under a deferential standard.
Against this view of affirmative action as "benign" was a
colorblind approach enthroning the individual, not the group, as
the proper unit of inquiry.
[I]t is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection
against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic
background... rather than the individual only because of his
membership in a particular group .... Political judgments
regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be
weighed in the constitutional balance .... When they touch
upon an individual's race or ethnic background, [they must be]
27
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
Under this colorblind framework all racial classifications were
subject to strict scrutiny. "When a classification denies an
23 See D. Marvin Jones, No Time for Trumpets: Title WI,Equality, and the Fin
de Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2311, 2334-44 (1994).

Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 472 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990).
26 See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 507 (Powell, J., concurring).
27 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (citations
omitted).
24
25
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individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely
because of his race or ethnic background, it must be regarded as
suspect. '28 Constitutional litigation is the moral equivalent of
war. And for some time the two sides, each representing
radically different models or paradigms of equality, faced each
other across an imaginary no-man's land of constitutional
indeterminacy and the inability of the court to muster a stable
majority for either view.
When the Court first considered race in Bakke, it did not reach
a majority opinion, leaving the issue of scrutiny undecided. In
that case, four justices analyzed the constitutionality of the
program applying intermediate scrutiny, while Justice Powell,
writing only for himself, advocated using strict scrutiny. The
same type of split occurred in 1980 when the Court considered
the constitutionality of a program to reserve federal public
works funds for minority-owned businesses in Fullilove v.
Klutznick; three Justices applied strict scrutiny while three
opted for intermediate scrutiny. For several more years, the
29
Court wavered on the proper level of scrutiny.
In the context of contracting affirmative action, voluntary
affirmative action was blessed by the deferential Fullilove
framework, while in the context of public employment
discrimination law under Washington v. Davis, 30 and Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,31 a strict scrutiny approach
prevailed.
Voting rights were governed by yet another
32
standard.
In 1988, however, the two theories essentially collapsed into
one. Thus in Croson, in the context of a minority set-aside
ordinance, the Court rejected the deference of Fullilove and
applied strict scrutiny with fatal effect. "'There is only one
Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern
impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of
review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.' "33

Id. at 305.
Soraya Fata & Amy Schumacher, Current Event, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.
Ct. 2325 (2003), 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1215 (2003).
30 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
31 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
32 United Jewish Org, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
33 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 515 n.5 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
28

29
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Under the strict scrutiny approach all racial classifications must
be strictly justified by a compelling reason and even then will
pass muster only if the program is "narrowly tailored. '3 4 In
essence the court replaced an ad hoc, checkerboard pattern of
decision-making with a categorical, one size fits all approach to
race. Strict scrutiny became a requirement in all cases of racial
classification under the equal protection clause. 35
This
heightened scrutiny was anchored by the principle of
colorblindness as a universal norm. "Classifications based on
race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions
36
of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."
The persistent theme in the Court's jurisprudence is that race
consciousness is invidious per se.
"[D]istinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature
odious." 37 Implicitly, by applying strict scrutiny, the Court
equated affirmative action with the erstwhile segregation of
blacks. 3
In one case the Court hyperbolically equated
affirmative action with "apartheid."
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who
may have little in common with one another but the color of
their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid. 39
This equation of affirmative action with discrimination is in turn
associated with what one writer calls a "narrative of
imposition."40 While the earlier model associated affirmative
34 Id. at

507.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
36 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
35

37 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 215
38 See id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[The Court] would equate a law that
made black citizens ineligible for military service with a program aimed at
recruiting black soldiers.").
39 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648.
40 As Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic have written:
We march, link arms, and sing with the newcomers, identifying with their
struggle. At some point, however, reaction sets in. We decide the group has
gone far enough. At first, justice seemed to be on their side. But now we see
them as imposing, taking the offensive, asking for concessions they do not
deserve. Now they are the aggressors, and we the victims.
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action with the history and lived experience of blacks, the
colorblind model posits that this so called remedy works at the
expense of "innocent people." 4'
This jurisprudence of
colorblindness, overrunning the terrain of equal protection much
like the frogs of Egypt, covers subject matter areas ranging from
42
minority contractors to voting rights.
Grutter is entirely consistent with this approach.
The
differences between the Grutter and Croson-Shaw outcomes
result from interest-convergence. 43 The universalism that all
racial classifications are inherently suspect remains intact. In
Grutter, the Court simply says that diversity is a compelling
reason per se. No record of prior discrimination is necessary.
The interest, which converges with formal equality, is that of
academic freedom. It is this, the sphere of decision-making and
the need for deference in here, which provides the foundation for
the Grutter approach.
But I say all this to say that Grutter is in my view simply an
extension of the Croson approach. Many seem to make a facile
move of associating diversity with the integrative ideal: part of
the solution as a tool for inclusion. On the other hand, most in
the civil rights community recognize Croson as the antithesis of
the integrative deal, part of the problem. Croson is rightly seen
this way: it rationalizes institutional inequality with slogans of
colorblindness. But in my view neither Grutter nor its animating
norm of diversity are part of the solution, they are each part of
the problem. This is true because there is no real difference
between the principles, which underlie both Grutter and Croson.
Those who wish to use Grutter as a support for any emancipatory
program will soon confront the fact that at the end of the day
Grutter and Croson are two branches of the same tree. If I am

We decide the group is asking for "special" status. We find their demands
excessive, tiresome, or frightening.
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Imposition, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025, 1026
(1994).
41 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003) ("[S]uch measures would
risk placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties'who bear no
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program
are thought to have suffered.'" (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 310 (1978)).
42 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw, 509 U.S. 630.
43 See generally DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES OF RACIAL REFORM (2005).
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right, what kind of fruit is the Grutter approach likely to bear? 44
III. MERIT V. MINORITY STUDENTS AS INDIVIDUALS
Grutter affirms diversity while it also affirms the
quantitative measures that inevitably privilege members of
social elites, the overwhelming majority of whom are white. The
current practice, which makes these quantitative measures allcontrolling, threatens to return us to 1960's levels of segregation.
If current trends continue, blacks may once again comprise only
3.5% of various law school populations. 45 Implicit in Grutter was
the premise that we need a critical mass of black students
because they bring perspectives which cannot be duplicated, in a
racially homogenous environment. The only conclusion to be
drawn as we move in the direction of historic levels of de facto
segregation is that blacks are academically inferior as a group.
This message devalues black students and devalues diversity.
Thus, Grutter upholds diversity in the abstract, but by upholding
a "testocracy,"46 which is discriminatory, it plants the seeds of the
resegregation we are seeing.
On the one hand, we have a system based on individual
merit, yet under the current quantitative approach, minority
applicants are effectively treated as a number.
To be an
individual is to be more than a number. The paradox of a merit
system based on test scores is that minorities are unable to show
their true worth as individuals.
They are invisible as
individuals. Effectively, given their average scores, blacks are
increasingly seen as members of an inferior group. They are
stigmatized by the testing practices of most law schools.

44 A bad tree cannot bring forth good fruit; neither can a good tree bring forth
bad fruit. Matthew 7:16-18 (New American).
45 For example in 1969, black students made up only 3.5% of the entire
University of Michigan student body. See John Friedl, Making a Compelling Case for
Diversity in College Admissions, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 7 (1999).
46 I borrow the term from Professor Lani Guinier. See Susan Sturm & Lani
Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 953, 968 (1996). 'We argue that the 'meritocracy' is neither fair nor
democratic, neither genuinely predictive nor functionally meritocratic.... Instead, a
'testocracy' masquerades as a meritocracy. By testocracy we refer to test-centered
efforts to score applicants, rank them comparatively, and then predict their future
performance." Id.
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IV. DIVERSITY V. DISCRIMINATION

The most important dualism we are experiencing is that on
the one hand, Grutter is egalitarian, while on the other, it is
colorblind. Grutter envisions diversity as a public norm, but the
question of how to implement it as a private responsibility.
Grutter supports diversity but on the premise that race is a proxy
for ethnicity or culture.
By having significant numbers of
minorities, this creates a stimulating academic environment.
Despite this alchemy of transmuting race into culture, race is
still a permissible consideration only when it is considered on a
case-by-case basis along with other factors such as geography,
disadvantage, etc.
Under the framework of Grutter, compensatory justice is not
a permissible basis for preferring minorities. Such a preference,
in Grutter's terms, victimizes innocent whites. As such, Grutter
operates as a shift of focus. First, doctrinally, we do not look at
racism or discrimination because it is irrelevant to the
justification for inclusion. 47 But more importantly, Grutter shifts
the focus by presenting a decision premised on discourse of
colorblindness as some kind of victory. Having created an
illusory linkage between colorblindness and inclusion, minorities
have embraced diversity as part of a vocabulary of emancipation.
Diversity as a norm is received as a kind of big tent under which
both conservatives and liberals, as well as minority advocates
and advocates of merit, could meet and find consensus on
inclusion. But Grutter privatizes the project of inclusion and
divorces all discussion of minorities from any reference to history
or the current social context of continuing patterns of
discrimination. This freewheeling decontextualization has laid
the groundwork perfectly for the current crises.
At a theoretical level, the problem with formal equality and
its alter-ego, color blindness, is that it is concerned only with
process. It is a framework of equality of opportunity only. The
spectre only hinted at by the current statistics is the spectre of
racial caste. The meaning of resegregation of American law
schools is that blacks will not only lack a means of legal
education, but will lack an important avenue of social mobility as
well. By affirming an ahistorical, individualistic, and socially
47

(2003).

See Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1625-26
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decontextualized colorblindness, the Grutter Court embraces a
narrow vision of equality which has no terms for, and no way to
conceptualize, the problem of racial caste. The anti-caste concern
is simply beyond the horizon of the Court's equal protection
methodology.
But the key fallacy involved in the story of Grutter as a
victory is the notion that in the private sphere of academia, there
is a clear consensus rejecting the racism of black inferiority. The
idea is that once law schools were free to consider race, the
enlightened liberal culture of academia would continue to
embrace minorities. My hypothesis is that stereotypical thinking
is still quite prevalent. 48
The stereotype that blacks are
intellectually inferior was the rationalization of choice for the era
of segregation. While a majority of law professors and deans
clearly favor racial inclusion in the abstract, I doubt that this
preference will survive fierce competition for elite status among
law schools.
Elitism and racism are not distinct. Elite standards are
intertwined
with stereotyped rationalizations
of racial
disparities. 49 Imagine a dean who says he simply wants to
48 See generally D. MARVIN JONES, RACE, SEX, AND SUSPICION: THE MYTH OF
THE BLACK MALE 8 (2005) (stating that although "stereotypes, originating in

unconscious racism, become the evil from which the black male must be shielded,"
the purpose of the book is not "to defend the black male," but "to deconstruct him").
"Social science research suggests that stereotypes serve as powerful heuristics,
supplying explanations for events even when evidence supporting nonstereotypical
explanations exists, and leading us to interpret situations and actions differently
when the race of the actors varies." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for RaceConsciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1067 (1991) (citations omitted); see also
Jennifer L. Eberhardt & R. Richard Banks, Letter to the Editor, Rutgers, Race and
Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at 23 (discussing political conservatives' and
liberals' prevailing assumptions of African Americans' inferiority); Brent Staples,
Editorial, The Presumption of Stupidity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at 14 (discussing
assumptions about African Americans that exist independently of affirmative
action).
49 In the first instance, the "objectivity" of the standard is non-existent. The
standards are chosen from a perspective of privileged whites based on the qualities
that they feel are important. To some extent, the standards chosen are those that
confirm their own class and race experiences as the norm. See Sturm & Guinier,
supra note 46, at 1034-35 (explaining that there is a "preoccupation with the false
promise of quantitative measurement" in the "selection, hiring and promotion
process[es]").
[C]onventional selection methods advantage candidates from higher socioeconomic backgrounds and disproportionately screen out women and people
of color, as well as those in lower-income brackets. When combined with
other unstructured screening practices, such as personal connections and
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position his law school. But s/he witnesses this pattern of
dwindling minority enrollments. How does s/he rationalize it? If
black students are increasingly not getting in, the answer must
increasingly be that they were not qualified. So long as a
substantial number of blacks do get in, the racial implications of
even disproportionate exclusion of minorities is ambiguous.
However, as minorities increasingly dwindle toward token
numbers, the sheer systematic nature of their exclusion will
objectively signify group unsuitability. 50
Either deans must
begin questioning and jettisoning discriminatory standards or
risk constructively saying that the stereotypes of black inferiority
are somewhat true. Of course the rationale explaining the
paucity of minorities is normally couched in terms of educational
disadvantage, but at the point of zero, or its functional
equivalent, the explanation becomes irrelevant. Objectively, law
schools are both buying into and sending the message that blacks
are, as a class, and as a rule, not fit to be in law school. The
practice of minimum LSAT scores and its underlying ideology of
merit inevitably draw on and perpetuate the historic narrative of
black inferiority.
These racial politics find synergy with the escalating attacks
on affirmative action. In his closing remarks to the Court in
Brown v. Board of Education,51 Thurgood Marshall framed the
issue as whether '"Negroes are inferior to all other human
beings.' "52 The issue today is the same as the issue in Brown.

alumni preferences, standardized testing creates an arbitrary barrier for
many otherwise-qualified candidates.
Id. at 982; see also Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias
and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1491-92 (1997) (concluding, after a review of the
history of law school admissions standards, that these standards were developed in
the context of the legal profession's explicit efforts to exclude minorities and women,
and that this fact explains much of the LSAT's disproportionate impact on
minorities).
My point is related but distinct: that the disparate outcomes on the test are
rationalized through an unanchored hypothesis, consisting of a prior assumption
that the fault is with blacks and not with the test. The hypothesis is not entirely
unanchored, however, for racial stereotypes effectively serve as the anchor.
50 This comes under the heading of "unexplainable on grounds other than race."
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
51 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52

RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 677 (2004) (quoting Thurgood Marshall).
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V. STANDARD 21 1-AUTONOMY V. EQUAL JUSTICE

As I write, law professors I know and respect are bravely
attempting to persuade the ABA to reform its accreditation
practices: to stop its own over-reliance upon LSAT scores. 53 To
do this, many have sought to have the ABA impose a standard of
diversity as a mandatory feature of admissions policies, as well
as a requirement of "measurable results." On the surface this is
entirely consistent with Grutter.54 This is true because in the
53 See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL], Standard
211, availableat http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter2.html.
Consistent with sound legal education policy and the Standards, a law
school shall demonstrate, or have carried out and maintained, by concrete
action, a commitment to providing full opportunities for the study of law
and entry into the profession by qualified members of groups, notably racial
and ethnic minorities, which have been victims of discrimination in various
forms. This commitment typically includes a special concern for
determining the potential of these applicants through the admission
process, special recruitment efforts, and a program that assists in meeting
the unusual financial needs of many of these students, but a law school is
not obligated to apply standards for the award of financial assistance
different from those applied to other students.
Id.
54 Professor Bernstein has argued that the Standard is unconstitutional on its
face.
[Tihe ABA has just ordered law schools to . . . violate the law-and is
resorting to blackmail to achieve its end.
Under these standards, any law school that seeks to maintain or acquire
ABA accreditation will be required to engage in racial preferences in hiring
and admissions, regardless of any federal, state or local laws that prohibit
of such policies.
Racial preferences will thus generally be necessary to comply with
Standard 211-despite the fact that several states, including California
and Florida, ban race as a factor in law school admissions or hiring or both.
Nothing in Grutter would permit such a law school to engage in racial
preferences.
David
Bernstein, Affirmative
Blackmail
(Feb.
16,
2006),
available at
http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=5561.
Bernstein is clearly wrong because the statute is stated in entirely race neutral
terms as the interpretation makes clear. There are two fundamental, fatal flaws in
Bernstein's reasoning. The first problem has to do with the dichotomy between
identification and selection (a critical dichotomy that Bernstein ignores). The
admissions process may be thought of as comprising two distinct stages. In the first
stage, one must identify the audience of students targeted or sought after through
the admissions process, and recruit and motivate members of that audience to apply.
This is the identification stage. In the second stage, the school now has a pool of
applicants and must select applicants from among this pool. This is the selection
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interpretations of the standard, a means to the goal of
"measurable results are all race-neutral." 55 The standard largely
reprises the strategies of race-neutrality developed in the context
stage. Grutter says that race may not be, in itself, a dispostive factor in
selection. Grutterin no way limits the authority or discretion of the school to
recruit those students that the University thinks would be good students. Bernstein
seems to have shot from the hip and not considered that the standard, as further
articulated by the interpretation, largely limits race-consciousness to the
identification or recruitment stage. This is still race neutral with respect to the
actual selection decision. Because of the recruitment emphasis the standard is
entirely consistent with Grutter.
The second problem is with Bernstein's use of legal language. Bernstein's false
moral equations ignore the difference between norms or goals and the means used to
achieve them. Diversity, a student body composed of people form all walks of life is a
goal and one entirely consistent with equal opportunity: it is precisely the image one
would expect to see were there no discrimination. Naked racial preference is not the
same. The means used to achieve diversity would seem to be the arbiter of
constitutionality. This is what Bernstein vitriolically overlooks.
55 The interpretation reads in pertinent part:
This standard does not specify the forms of concrete actions a school must
take in order to satisfy its equal employment obligation. The satisfaction of
such obligation is based on the totality of its actions. Among the kinds of
actions that can demonstrate a school's commitment to providing equal
opportunities for the study of law and entry into the profession by qualified
members of groups that have been the victims of discrimination are the
following:
a. Participating in job fairs and other programs designed to bring
minority students to the attention of employers.
b. Establishing procedures to review the experiences of minority
graduates to determine whether their employers are affording equal
opportunities to members of minority groups for advancement and
promotion.
c. Intensifying law school recruitment of minority applicants,
particularlyat colleges with substantialnumbers of minority students.
d. Promoting programs to identify outstanding minority high school
students and college undergraduates,and encouraging them to study
law.
e. Supporting the activities of the Council on Legal Education
Opportunity (CLEO) and other programs that enable more
disadvantagedstudents to attend law school.

f. Creating a more favorable law school environment for minority
students by providing academic support services, supporting minority
student organizations,promoting contacts with minority lawyers, and
hiring minority administrators.
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL, supra note 53, Standard 211, Interpretation 211-1.
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of local governments attempting to comply with the race-neutral
contracting requirements of Croson.56 In the Croson context,
local governments, unable to use goals and timetables, are often
using job fairs, increased recruitment, and increasing the
"attractiveness" of their markets to minorities. This standard is
constitutional only to the extent that it adheres carefully to this
boundary between racial quotas and goals on the one hand and
race-neutral criteria on the other.
The bottom line though is neither the ABA nor any agency
can require a certain percentage of minorities. Requiring
"measurable results" in terms of programs and job fairs need not
produce any particular percentage. Standard 211 does not reach
that point and cannot reach that point. This boundary between
race-conscious practices involved in identifying and recruiting
qualified blacks on the one hand and race conscious results on
the other traces the dividing line between effective strategies for
racial inclusion and those which are not. In my experience raceneutral approaches generally produce tokenism.5 7 "In order to
get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is
58
no other way."
In the admissions process of law schools itself, Rachel Moran
vividly notes how such race-neutral practices failed miserably to
produce meaningful percentages of minorities at Berkeley. If one
scrapes away the rhetorical patina of "results" and strips the
standard down to the actual means endorsed, there is no
difference, as narrowly constrained by Grutter, between this
standard and the failed race-neutral practices of the past. It is
perhaps hoped that somehow the whole might be greater than
the sum of its parts: that authority of the ABA as the accrediting
56

57

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
See William C. Kidder, Silence, Segregation, and Student Activism at Boalt

Hall, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1167 (2003) (reviewing ANDREA GUERRERO, SILENCE AT BOALT
HALL: THE DISMANTLING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (2002)).

Yet, in the six years since affirmative action was banned (1997-2002), these
groups comprised only 11.3% of first-year enrollments at Boalt. By
contrast, African Americans, Latinas/os, and American Indians comprised
23.4% of total first-year Boalt enrollments in the most recent years with
affirmative action (1993-1996), meaning that Proposition 209 and the U.C.
Regents' ban had the overall effect of slashing enrollments for these groups
by more than half at the University of California's flagship law school.
Id. at 1173.
58 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 406 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
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body together with the rhetoric of official exhortation will
produce something more here than the race-neutral means
employed would suggest. But this is an unanchored hope. To the
extent that the pool of minorities continues to shrink because of
escalating LSAT minimum scores, the LSAT minimum score
becomes the sole arbiter of the universe of minority students who
gain admission. While appeals to diversity can create enhanced
competition for this shrinking pool it has no effect on the size of
the pool or the trend toward shrinking which is taking place.
The problem underlying the irony of a case that extols
diversity as a goal but limits the means of achieving it to race
neutral standards is the embedded dichotomy between
educational autonomy and equal justice.
A core normative
premise of Grutter is the autonomy of educational institutions to
choose the kinds of students who will enrich the learning process.
Grutter is not animated by any concern for blacks, simply the
desire to create a space of freedom or liberty for educators to
develop their pedagogical values through the admissions process.
Implicit here is the notion that educational institutions have no
obligation to address issues of social or inequality. Grutter is
59
deaf, dumb, and blind to those concerns.
Those who advocated Standard 211, in my view, did so out of
a just concern about increasing racial exclusivity and ultimately
about racial caste. But Grutter, as a creature of educational
autonomy, is not conceivably a viable platform to base any
program of racial justice. Grutter is not within the paradigm of
equal justice but within a much older paradigm of laissez-faire.
Grutter is the new Lochner. Grutter will continue to constrain
means to race-neutral means, to uphold an LSAT testocracy,
which is crushing minority hopes, to insulate the academy from
any serious critique of the narrative of black inferiority, which is
increasingly becoming more dense and more salient within the
admissions practices of law schools who have under Grutter
renewed freedom to raise LSAT scores as high as they like no
matter the adverse impact. If tokensism arises from this it is not
irony, it is not inconsistent; it is a precise reflection of the
59 The University is free to define diversity in such a way that diversity

embraces students who in their backgrounds reflect a concern for issues of social
inequality. But, Grutter does not associate itself with any substantive social justice
norms and Universities, in my view, are left free-laissez-fair above all-to ignore
them.
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subordination of equality, as social justice, to the norm of
autonomy (liberty). The normative hierarchy of Grutter is in
direct conflict with minority social goals.
VI. RACIAL CLIMATE
The increasing over-reliance upon the LSAT does not occur
in a vacuum. In 1995, the Regents of the University of California
abolished the use of racial, ethnic, and gender preferences in
admissions. 60 The following year, the state's voters cemented the
61
Regents' decision by constitutionalizing the ban on preferences.
In November 1998, Washington voters passed Initiative 200, a
ballot initiative with wording identical to Proposition 209.62 In
November 1999, Governor Jeb Bush adopted his "One Florida"
plan, by executive order. Under this plan, Florida discontinued
race-conscious affirmative action in the public university system,
beginning in 2000 at the undergraduate level, and in 2001 at the
graduate and professional levels. 63 At the time of this writing,
anti-affirmative action groups have succeeded in placing on the
ballot before Michigan voters a measure that would dismantle
the gains of recent years by banning all race- and sex-conscious
programs throughout state employment, contracting, and
education.
"A major object of the effort is to eliminate
affirmative
action
admissions
at
the
University
of
Michigan ... "64
There is startling lacunae separating the discussion of the
over-reliance on the LSAT and the attacks on affirmative action.

60 See William Claiborne, California Ban on Affirmative Action Cleared; State's
Voter Initiative Goes Into Effect Today, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1997, at A01.
61 See id.
62 See Steven A. Holmes, Victorious Preference Foes Look for New Battlefields,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at A25.
Proposition 209 was adopted by the voters of California as a ballot
initiative in the November 5, 1996 general election, by a margin of 54 to 46
percent of the nearly 9 million votes cast. Formally entitled the "California
Civil Rights Initiative," Proposition 209 amends the California Constitution
so that it generally prohibits race- and gender-based affirmative action by
California state agencies.
Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 195-96 (1997) (footnotes
omitted).
63 See Anita Kumar, UF's Grad Schools Lag in Minorities, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Fla.), July 5, 2003, at lB.
64 Miranda Massie, Civil Rights Are in Peril; Court of Appeals Lets Regressive
Amendment Go On 2006 Ballot, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 22, 2005, at 13.
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Both have the same effect. The increasing acceptance by voters
of propositions banning affirmative action may represent a
widening, deepening embrace of the idea that blacks are lowering
standards and standing in the way of more qualified white
applicants. It seems more than coincidental that the diminishing
black enrollments are occurring in tandem with these referenda.
I write, not to prove that the current over-reliance is based on
stereotypes, but to make a plea that the current pattern of
resegregation be seen in a larger context-one in which
Americans in the post-civil rights era are questioning, retreating
from, or rejecting the assumptions and premises of the "second
reconstruction."
VII. SOLUTIONS: TOWARD A NEW STRATEGY FOR RACIAL JUSTICE:
LEGISLATIVE REFORM

So, where do we go from here? First, we need some friends. We
need some new allies. The entire civil-rights struggle needs a
new interpretation, a broader interpretation. We need to look
at this civil-rights thing from another angle-from the inside as
well as from the outside .... That old interpretation excluded
us. It kept us out. So, we're giving a new interpretation to the
civil-rights struggle, an interpretation that will enable us to
come into it, take part in it .... 65
As a tactical matter, proponents have accepted a paradigm that
misdirects attention and energy into trench warfare, rather
than into pursuing a progressive agenda.
By reacting
defensively to the current onslaught, they have foreclosed
discussion of new, innovative strategies for racial and gender
justice ....

66

Grutter is not our friend. It reflects our new captivity within the
paradigm of formal equality as it intersects and links up with an
equally imprisoning ideology of merit. In its doubleness, its
appearance as a harbinger of inclusion, it is seductive to try to
work within its framework. We must not.
I think that what we need to do is try to understand how
African Americans faced with a similar political-legal dilemma
addressed the problem. I have said in many ways the current
65 Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet (Apr. 3, 1964),
http://www.historicaldocuments.com/BallotortheBulletMalcolmX.htm.
66 Sturm & Guinier, supra note 46, at 955.

available at
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problem of resegregation of the nation's law schools is
reminiscent of the historical moment of Brown.
Charles
Hamilton Houston, the architect in Brown, utilized a strategy,
which I refer to as co-opting the dominant paradigm.
He
accepted the segregationist law as it was; he initially made no
effort to relitigate Plessy v. Ferguson.67 (Grutter may well be the
new Plessy.) He then went on to use the law as it was to different
ends than that for which it had been constructed. As I write, this
debate is going on in the law reviews about these practices.
Simultaneously, law professors I know and respect are bravely
attempting to persuade the ABA to reform its accreditation
practices: to stop its own over-reliance upon LSAT scores. To do
this, many have sought to have the ABA impose a standard of
diversity as a mandatory feature of admissions policies, as well
as a requirement of "measurable results." This would, in my
view, be only superficially consistent with Grutter, because it
smacks of either redistributive justice or affirmative action goals,
which will be read as a "quota." This, in my view, is to argue out
of a just concern about racial caste against the dominant
paradigm. Advocating diversity will not work, because even if
one sees it as an anti-racist norm, it is still, at best, tenuously
and precariously situated on the agenda of legal education.
Diversity is a currency that is increasingly losing its purchasing
power in the face of increasing competition, as the American
public shifts away from all notions of "affirmative action."
Let us speak no more of this diversity. And let us stop
attempting to close the barn door lest the horse of affirmative
action is stolen. The significance of Grutter is that the horse is
already gone. 68 But we need not mourn its loss. 69 Affirmative

67

163 U.S. 537 (1895).

Affirmative action still exists as a remedy for identified, proven
discrimination. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 168-70 (1987); Local 28
of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 445 (1986).
However, voluntary affirmative action, as that term has always been
understood, is pass6. Affirmative action has traditionally meant one of two things. In
its broadest meaning, it was understood as a floor or minimum level beyond which
traditionally unrepresented minorities would not sink, and to conservatives, a quota.
More narrowly, it was understood as a notion that race was always relevant to
admissions or hiring where blacks were concerned as a marker for disadvantage or
in Bakke's terms "unique perspectives." In any case, it was understood to authorize a
broad, systemic use of race. I do not think either of those readings survive Grutter.
Grutter stands for two fundamental constitutional values. One is the right of the
individual to be considered as an individual not merely a member of a group. The
68
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second is the "freedom of the university to choose" a student body which includes
students of diverse backgrounds. What Grutter finds in the margins of its colorblind
approach is a liberal interpretation to what individualized treatment may
encompass.
Grutter expressly held that the university may consider race on a case-by-case
basis. Grutter also endorsed the goal of the university in seeking a "critical mass of
blacks."
But this mantra of "critical mass" was "tricky magic." The Court upholds raceconsciousness, but only as a discretionary thumb on the scale-as a metaphor to
guide discretion, not as a fixed percentage or floor:
This was done, Shields testified, to ensure ... a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students .... Shields stressed, however, that

he did not seek to admit any particular number or percentage of...
minority students.
...Jeffrey Lehman, also testified .... [that he] did not quantify critical
mass in terms of numbers or percentages .... When asked about the extent

to which race is considered in admissions, Lehman testified that it varies
from one applicant to another. In some cases, according to Lehman's
testimony, an applicant's race may play no role ....
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 309, 318-19 (citations omitted).
However, in the case the admissions director did not associate a critical mass
with any particular percentage. It was an ever present but "background"
consideration. To appreciate the limits of Grutter let us ask what more a university
could do. A spectrum of inclusive strategies appear below:
A. The state, the university, or the department mandates racial goals or
minimum percentages of blacks which should be admitted to achieve a
"critical mass."
B. The university decrees that to achieve "diversity" all blacks "shall" be given
preferential treatment in the selection process on the basis of race to
promote diversity.
C. The university decrees that all departments must strive for diversity and
that officials "may" consider race in the selection process on a case by case
basis to achieve diversity.
D. The university decrees that all departments must achieve measurable
results in terms of diversity and that to do so they shall affirmatively
identify, recruit, and encourage minorities to apply.
A. is so clearly unconstitutional as to require no discussion. B. in my view would be
equally unconstitutional as well. Grutter represents a structural resolution in that it
makes the individual admissions expert or team the locus of decision-making as to
what criteria to use in deciding whom they want. Moreover, it authorized this
discretion in the context of a process that considered race on a "case-by-case" basis.
This "freedom to choose" and its inherent flexibility and sensitivity is precisely what
liberal individualism celebrates and requires. Any effort to substitute systemwide
program for flexibility, or to impose race-consciousness across the board would
collide with the whole logic of Grutter.
Let's translate this into doctrinal terms. Grutter's premise is that we must
engage in a balancing test to determine the legality of voluntary affirmative action.
The presumptive harm of considering race must be balanced against the goal of
achieving a diverse student body. Grutter resolves the balance in favor of diversity
but only because the program is "narrowly tailored." It is narrowly tailored because
it is flexible. It is flexible because the court limits the program in time (it must
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action was only a wistful, doomed strategy of addressing the
issue of discrimination. The issue was discrimination; it is still
the same. While the traditional notion of affirmative action is
passe, the anti-discrimination framework is still viable. I want to
suggest a way this framework can be used in the context of the
current problem. Let us recall Professor Kidder's statistical
scenario. A black student with a 3.75 grade point average has no
better chance of getting into even one law school than the
average white student with a 3.25 average. Thus, even some of
the most highly qualified black students will be rejected under
current admissions policies. As the over-reliance upon the LSAT
continues and minimum LSAT scores increase, the disparity
between qualifications and acceptance will likely increase. At
the same time, it is my suspicion that the practice of imposing
minimum standards is not only yet to be validated, but also
incapable of validation.
As a civil rights lawyer for over twenty years, my starting
point is, "Where would that student go to obtain legal redress?
Who is he going to call?" In a practical sense, the answer is no
one. With the exception of Title VI, under all available statutes
s/he would have to show some intentional wrongdoing to trigger a
meaningful level of judicial review. 70 Without such a showing,

sunset in twenty-five years) and because race is not the predominant factor in the
selection process. Flexible in context refers to considering race on a case-by-case
basis. The decision to institutionalize a racial preference in any form in the selection
process is the kind of sweeping, inflexible program that would be suspect as racial
politics. Said another way, how could any systemic or standardized consideration of
race in the selection process (as opposed to the recruitment stage) be individualized
as Gruttercommands?
C. is constitutional because it is precisely the case that Grutter addresses. D. is
constitutional as well because while race is considered for purposes of recruitment
no one is prejudiced in the selection process itself. There is no cognizable taking or
harm. Of course, the only effective way to help blacks would be A. This is what
Grutterforbids.
69 1 would
note that I have fought for affirmative action in the past. I
represented the NAACP in local debates with Ward Connerly. I represented the
NAACP again when Governor Bush held hearings on his misleading and divisive
"One Florida" plan, and have devoted much of my life to civil rights issues.
70 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 230-31 (1976). As summed up by one
law professor:
A "racially neutral" policy is not unconstitutional merely because it results
in racial disparity that the government cannot objectively justify.
Washington v. Davis seems to signal that if governmental officers are
ignorant of racial disparity produced by the policies that they have adopted,
or even if they know but are indifferent, they do not violate the
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there would be no requirement for the offending school to
validate the practice. Tracing the pattern of over-reliance on the
LSAT to some identifiable discriminatory animus/discriminatory
intent is a practical impossibility.
The issue under Title VI is slightly different, but the door
seems, in all practicality, just as closed. Under Title VI, states
are in fact prohibited from discriminating on the basis of adverse
impact. 7 1 In the past, students have succeeded in challenging
72
admissions practices that disproportionately excluded them.
However, in Alexander v. Sandoval,73 the Supreme Court held
that no private right of action exists because Congress did not
specifically create one. 74 Title VI's prohibition against disparate
impact is intact. Certainly, the Department of Education can
promulgate regulations against disparate impact. Some have
argued that a private party could sue to enforce regulations
prohibiting disparate impact. 75 But this is a speculative theory of
litigation 76 linked to what strategically is a circumlocutory
approach.

Constitution so long as they did not intend to bring about such a result.
David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action Cases:
Reconsidering the Supreme Court's Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based
Decision-Making by Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L. REV. 483, 509-10 (2004)
(footnote omitted); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (holding that discriminatory intent must be proven before
the Court will find that the Equal Protection Clause has been violated).
71 Although Title VI does not by its terms provide for disparate impact
litigation, regulations promulgated to implement the statute explicitly forbid
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What is missing is a substantive right to sue for testing
abuse. My sense is that the minimum score approach is deeply
entrenched in our current academic culture. It is a recent
expression of hegemonic notions of merit interacting with a
society-wide retreat on the civil rights assumptions of the 1960s.
There is a need for a statute which would provide legal redress
for the student who is qualified in terms of grades and all other
relevant criteria, but who is disqualified by express or implied
minimum score requirements on the LSAT. We need to test the
test. We need new legislation in the form of a statute which
would make law schools presumptively liable for the
discriminatory impact of admissions test requirements. To rebut
the presumption, law schools utilizing minimum test score
requirements would have to validate the cut-off they were
imposing.
The legitimacy of the LSAT would not be in question. In the
past, blacks have assumed the position of someone trying to
prove that there is something wrong with the test. Under the
framework I propose, the burden will be on schools that misuse
the test to explain why they are doing this. Of course my
colleagues tell me there is no support for such a bill in either
house of Congress. This is not the issue. By merely introducing
legislation we can highlight, in hearings and in the media, how
this practice is unanchored--creating
an artificial and
insurmountable barrier to the dreams of minorities, while
facilitating a virtual shut down in the pipeline of minority
attorneys. The system will not respond to slogans like diversity.
The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. But
history has shown it does sometimes respond to political
resistance. The effort at legislative reform could become a site of
effective resistance and public education.
If we form coalitions, if we put this issue on the front burner
of our political agenda, we can win this. But unless we do this,
we will, like the abolitionist lawyer in the film, have to apologize
to a generation of would-be black law students why, despite the
Court's insistence on formal equality, they cannot go to law
school. And we would have to explain to them how the law
"almost works."

